The natural world presents a myriad of dangers that can threaten an organism's survival. This diversity of threats is matched by a set of universal and species specific defensive behaviors which are often subsumed under the emotions of fear and anxiety. A major issue in the field of affective science, however, is that these emotions are often conflated and scientists fail to reflect the ecological conditions that gave rise to them. I attempt to clarify these semantic issues by describing the link between ethologically defined defensive strategies and fear. This in turn, provides a clearer differentiation between fears, the contexts that evoke them and how they are organized within defensive survival circuits.
Introduction
Charles Lyell's Principles of Geology [1] , which proposed the theory that the Earth's surface was shaped by slow incremental changes, was a key inspiration for Darwin's 'On the Origin of Species' [2] . Analogous to Lyell's geological theory, the idea that complex nervous systems emerged from simpler organisms via similar incremental processes fit with both Darwin's and Lamarck's theories that the inheritance of phenotypes are the direct result of the changes in the organism's ecology. Reaching across the modern scientific disciplines of paleobiology, ethology and neuroscience, there is agreement that when one views the human brain through the lens of evolution, our brains have gone through the same gradual processes, and in turn, that we possess some of the same phyletic neural structures and innate reactions that our mammalian cousins use to survive. It has also become clear, however, that the human neural circuits are unique. This uniqueness comes from our highly expanded cortex, which includes a plastic machinery that allows us to probe near and distant futures [3] , to consciously experiences emotions (i.e. feelings) [4] and cognitively regulate them [5] . The current consensus is that older neural structures combine with newer ones to form a highly complex circuitry that has evolved to maximize fitness by reacting to, and anticipating, predatory, social and homeostatic threats [6 ] .
While few scientists dispute that animal and human brains have evolved similar circuits to combat a variety of ecological threats, there is controversy. At the forefront of this debate is LeDoux's 'Survival Circuits Theory' [7] which states that affective scientists should rethink the notion that emotions, such as fear, are similar between humans and other animals. LeDoux proposes that 'fear' is a cognitive process associated with higher order 'feelings' of terror or horror. Thus, fear comes about via conscious experiences and emerges from brain structures involved in what LeDoux calls general networks of cognition [4] . This is differentiated from defensive survival circuits, which are involved the first line of defense against predators and result in innate defensive reactions. Defensive survival circuits contribute to cognitive fear, but do not constitute fear. Thus, given the conscious and subjective nature of fear, only defensive survival circuits can be studied in other animals. This distinction has vigorously been debated [8] , yet this debate opens up a new opportunity for affective scientists to reconsider how to define and investigate fear.
In this article, I argue that to successfully map human and animal defensive survival circuits, researchers should first investigate the ecological conditions that evoke them. This approach also provides clearer definitions of fear and anxiety, which are often used interchangeably, conflated and not tied to a well-defined set of natural conditions. In turn, describing the ecological conditions that map onto different level of predation, we find that different patterns emerge in behavior, computations, strategies, psychological states that have distinct and overlapping defensive survival circuits. This is not a new concept. 
